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job than people in rich ones? How do these human capital decisions impact on inequality?
To give quantitative answers to these questions, I build an overlapping generations model
with optimal human capital accumulation and a given distribution of abilities. Variation in
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low inequality, both within and across cohorts.
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W h yd op e o p l ei np o o rc o u n t r i e sl e a v es c h o o lal o te a r l i e rt h a np e o p l ei nr i c ho n e s ?W h ys h o u l d
we expect people in poor countries to invest less in learning on-the-job than people in rich ones?
How do these human capital decisions impact on inequality?
To address these questions, we build on Blanchard’s (1985) seminal contribution and develop
an overlapping generations framework with schooling and learning on-the-job decisions that can
be used to illuminate many issues. In this paper, we use the framework to argue that with fast
population growth, high mortality rates and high interest rates, there is little incentive to invest in
human capital, so people leave school early and their earnings proﬁles are relatively ﬂat. We also
argue that differences in demographic factors, in conjunction with a stable distribution of abilities,
can account for large cross-country differences in inequality, both within and across cohorts.
Our learning-on-the job model is a contribution in its own right. We extend the famous Ben-
Porath (1967) human capital model to uncertain lifetimes by assuming that mortality rates do not
depend on age. As emphasized by Blanchard (1985), an age-invariable mortality rate is able to
capture the ﬁnite aspect of lives while at the same time making aggregation tractable. But this
assumption also has the unfortunate consequence that people of different ages have exactly the
same lifetime horizon. This led Blanchard (ibid., p. 224) to believe that his formulation was not
suitable to capture “the change in behavior over life”. Here we build a model of human capital
accumulation on-the-job that, despite the assumption of constant mortality rates, generates an
age-dependent human capital investment behaviour and a hump-shaped earnings proﬁle like the
ones we observe in the data. This is achieved by assuming that, all else equal, an individual’s
ability to acquire more human capital on-the-job declines with age. This assumption turns out to
be well supported by empirical evidence. At the same time, because constancy of mortality rates
is preserved, aggregation across cohorts is still tractable, as in Blanchard (1985).
We attempt not only to quantify the extent to which low life expectancy and high population
growth rates may explain low investment rates in human capital, but also the impact of these
decisions on within-country inequality. Our explanation for inequality is essentially based on
demographic factors. It rests on two assumptions and one indisputable fact. We assume, ﬁrst,
that there is a time-invariant distribution of abilities in the population, second, that there are
diminishing returns to schooling years but these set in faster for low ability people than for high
ability people. As for the fact, it is the large variability in mortality and population growth rates
that has been observed both across time and space.
The intuition for our results can be conveyed in a few paragraphs. Our model of the ini-
tial schooling choice is essentially the one proposed by Rosen (1977) and extended by Kalemli-
Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) to account for uncertain lives: individuals choose schooling to
maximize the present value of (expected) lifetime earnings; at the margin, the return to schooling
must be equal to the effective discount rate, the latter being increasing in the interest rate and
the mortality rate. Once individuals enter the workforce, they may increase their human capital
through on-the-job learning. In this respect, the model is, as stated above, an extension of the
Ben-Porath (1967) model that incorporates uncertain lifetimes in a tractable manner. Individuals
1choose how to allocate their time between production and investment in human capital with the
objective of maximizing lifetime earnings.
High mortality and population growth rates lead to high effective discountrates, directly in the
case of mortality, indirectly for both via their effect on the interest rate. These demographic forces
mean that people rationally choose to invest little in formal education as well as in learning on-
the-job. Moreover, because of high discount rates, the dispersion in schooling decisions between
high ability individuals and low ability individuals is also small. This is turn generates a relatively
small dispersion of the human capital of new workers, and since these workers will invest little
on-the-job, experience effects on productivity will also be small. So the picture here is of a
relatively equal society in which very able and not so able individuals make similar human capital
investment decisions.
Consider what would happen if mortality and population growth rates fell. People would stay
longer in school and would also accumulate more human capital at work. Moreover, under some
plausible assumptions, the more able would react to these changes more strongly than the less
able. This in turn would generate larger variability in schooling choices, in the human capital
of new workers, and through the compounding effect of learning on-the-job, these effects could
signiﬁcantly increase the dispersion of earnings in society.
In our model, decreases in mortality, population growth and interest rates should cause both
income per capita and inequality to rise. This is because the more able beneﬁt more from the
same reduction in mortality and interest rates than the less able. Introducing the government
in this framework would allow us to analyze the impact of several redistribution policies. For
instance, governments that implement compulsory schooling laws might be able to reduce the
dispersion of schooling choices at the lower end of the distribution and reduce overall inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we focus on endogenous
investment in human capital while on-the-job. In Section 3 we endogenize the schooling decision.
We then proceed to aggregate productive human capital and physical capital (Section 4) and to
compute the general equilibrium of the economy (Section 5). Next we introduce heterogeneity
in ability and we brieﬂy describe the small changes in the model that this modiﬁcation entails
(Section 6). In Section 7, we calibrate this model to the U.S. balanced growth observations of the
second half of the twentieth century. We perform simulations in Section 8. Finally, we conclude
in Section 9.
2 On-the-job human capital accumulation
Consider a closed economy populated by a continuum of overlapping generations of agents. Each
generation is made of many agents who face a constant probability of death per unit of time.
Individuals go through two phases in their lives: ﬁrst, they go to school for a certain number of
years, then they leave school voluntarily and work until they die. During this second phase, they
have to decide, at any point in time, how much to consume and how much time they should spend
acquiring additional human capital or working, taking as given current and future wage and rental
2rates. Each newborn is endowed with a certain amount of human capital but no ﬁnancial assets.
Individuals are assumed to have no concerns for their descendants after their death. Finally, they
have perfect foresight about all economic variables, except for the fact that they do not know their
time of death, only the hazard rate.
In thissection weabstractfromendogenousschoolingbyassuming thatall agentsgo toschool
for the same, exogenously given, number of years. We focus instead on endogenous investment
in human capital while on-the-job. The point of departure is the Ben-Porath (1967) model as
developed by Heckman (1976). Under the latter’s formulation, the individual has to decide how
much to consume and how to allocate their time between leisure, work and investment in order to
maximize lifetime utility. Heckman (1976) avoids the analysis of corner solutions by assuming
that the optimal choice is given by interior solutions throughout the individual’s life; there is
no initial phase of full time education. His analysis therefore applies to the choices made by a
student, in high school or college say, that already works part-time.1 We build on Ben-Porath
(1967) in focusing on the labour-investment trade-off, but we follow Heckman (1976), ﬁrst, in
including the choice of consumption and second, in dealing with interior solutions only.
A brief overview of the remainder of this section may prove useful to the reader. First, we set
out the formal problem which is solved by the typical agent. We also take some time to justify
the modiﬁcations we introduce to the Ben-Porath (1967) formulation. For expositional reasons,
we ﬁnd it convenient to place the agent at the beginning of their working life. At each moment
in time, the agent has to decide how much to consume and how to allocate their time between
work and investment in human capital. Second, we solve for the optimality conditions of the
formal problem (Section 2.1). Among other things, we establish that optimality requires that the
marginal returns to time allocated to work and investment must be equal at all ages. Next, we turn
to the time paths of human assets and labour income (Section 2.2). Provided some reasonable
conditions are satisﬁed, we show that the proﬁles for human capital, for productive human capital
and for labour income will be hump-shaped. We also study how those time paths vary with the
interest rate, the mortality rate and the rate of technical change. Finally, we determine the proﬁles
for consumption and ﬁnancial assets from birth (Section 2.3). As usual, consumption will grow
over time provided the real interest rate is greater than the subjective discount rate. On average
(since they can die at any point in time), individuals start out with zero ﬁnancial assets, incur debt
at least until they leave formal education, but then eventually their earnings become bigger than
their consumption and interest payments on accumulated debt.
Let us then consider the problem faced by an individual, born at time j, who is about to start
their working life at time j0, after completing s years of formal education.2 Since they face an
uncertain life, they will maximize their expected lifetime utility, where the expectation is taken
with respect to the distribution of the duration of life. Yaari (1965) showed that it is possible to
write this objective function in the same way as the one under certain lives but with an altered
discount factor. Brieﬂy stated, an uncertain life makes an individual discount future consumption
1In his words, “There is considerable evidence that the “representative” high school and college student works...one
could deﬁne a schooling period less arbitrarily as one in which hours of work are low...” (ibid., pp. S14-5)
2Hence, j
0 = j + s.
3more heavily than the typical inﬁnitely lived agent. If ρ is, as usual, the subjective discount rate,
m the instantaneous mortality rate, and the individual stands at time j0, then the discount factor
attached to the utility obtained at time v (v ≥ j0)w i l lb ee q u a lt oe−(ρ+m)(v−j0). Hence the






where θ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ>0; and c(j,v) denotes
consumption at time v for an individual born at time j (j ≤ v). 3
Let w(v) and r stand, respectively, for the wage per unit of human capital and the riskless
rate of interest at time v. We drop the time argument associated with r from the start because we
focus exclusively on balanced growth paths, henceforth BGPs. More speciﬁcally, we assume the
ﬂow Y (t) of ﬁnal output at t is given by Y (t)=K(t)α [A(t)Hy(t)]
1−α,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1); A(t)
is an index of labour augmenting technical progress which grows at the rate g; K(t) is physical
capital and Hy(t) is the stock of human capital allocated to production (productive human capital
for short). In equilibrium, terms K(t) and A(t)Hy(t) will grow at the same rate and both factors
will be paid their marginal products, so r will be constant while w(v) will grow at the rate g per
unit of time.
Leth(j,v),y(j,v)anda(j,v)stand, respectively, forhumancapital, labourincome, and(real)
ﬁnancial assets; si(j,v) for the fraction of time spent investing in human capital; and hi(j,v) for
the number of efﬁciency units of human capital used in its production, invested human capital for
short. By normalizing the time available at each moment to unity, we have that
hi(j,v)=si(j,v)h(j,v) y(j,v)=w(v)h(j,v)(1 − si(j,v))
The individual accumulates ﬁnancial assets a(j,v) according to an almost standard equation:
d
dv
a(j,v)=y(j,v) − c(j,v)+( r + m)a(j,v) (2)
The only difference between a standard equation and this one is the real rate of return that
individuals can obtain on their ﬁnancial wealth. Here the rate of return is the sum of the riskless
rate of interest and the probability of death. This assumes that individuals have no concerns for
their descendants after their death; that perfect markets for loans and annuities secured by life
insurance exist; and that the number of individuals of each cohort is so large that there is no
aggregate uncertainty regarding the size of surviving cohorts.4
The individual is also able to accumulate human capital on-the-job according to
d
dv
h(j,v)=E(j,v)1−bhi(j,v)b − δh(j,v) (3)
3More generally, x(j,v) stands for the value of the variable x at time v for an individual born at time j,i nt h em a i n
text.
4For the pioneering paper, see Yaari (1965). For textbook expositions assuming a constant mortality rate see, for
instance, Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp. 115-26) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 179-86).
4where E(j,v) is an age-varying efﬁciency term that is beyond the agent’s control from the
moment they start working onwards; b is a parameter strictly between zero and one to ensure
the gross production function is strictly concave with respect to hi(j,v); and δ is the rate of
depreciation of human capital. Notice how, for simplicity, we are abstracting from the direct costs
of acquiring human capital: the only cost of investment in human capital is lost labour income.
If we had instead of term E(j,v)1−b ac o n s t a n t ,EBP say, then equation (3) would amount
to the Ben-Porath (1967) formulation: dh(j,v)/dv = EBPhi(j,v)b −δh(j,v),w h e r eEBP is an
efﬁciency parameter that can be interpreted as a person’s ability to learn. It is plausible, however,
to allow EBP to vary positively with the level of schooling as for instance Heckman, Lochner and
Taber (1998) have done. This is because formal education may not only increase one’s starting
productivity but also permanently increase one’s ability to acquire additional human capital on-
the-job. The latter effect will arise if education equips a person with learning methods say that
are only, or at least more effectively, acquired in school.
We capture this effect of education on learning efﬁciency and introduce a new one associated







where φ<1 and λ>0. The term in equation (4) in square brackets captures the permanent
effect of schooling, the exponential term the effect of age. We therefore propose that one’s ability
to learn, all else equal, declines with age at the exponential rate λ.
There is a great amount of evidence to back the assumption that people’s ability declines with
age. Studies in psychology, physiology, neurophysiology, neuroscience, gerontology, ageing,
motor behaviour and so on discuss and measure through batteries of tests the extent to which
people age, both physically and mentally. That physical ability declines with age from early
adulthood is beyond dispute. That the same phenomenon happens to cognitive abilities, the ones
that are most relevant for modern economies, may be less obvious but no less real. Naturally,
the extent to which people’s mental abilities deteriorate is not uniform at all across their brains’
functions or capabilities. For example, it has been found that verbal ﬂuency seems to increase
until the mid-ﬁfties and that its decline from its peak onwards takes place at very mild rates.
By contrast, a person’s memory, or the ability to perform mathematical computations, to engage
in several activities at the same time, to reason quickly or to perform new tasks, all start an
inexorable decline from the early twenties onwards. For more on this issue, see for instance
Avolio and Waldman (1994).
Summing up, most learning activities from early adulthood onwards have to make use of abil-
ities that, after controlling for other factors such as initial human capital, will inevitably decline
with age. From this it follows naturally that, once again taking other factors as given, the ef-
ﬁciency with which a person acquires more human capital must decline with age. This is the
crucial modiﬁcation to the standard Ben-Porath (1967) model that allows us to generate realistic
hump-shaped proﬁles despite age-invariant death rates.
The individual’s intertemporal problem at time j0 is therefore to maximize (1) by choosing
5proﬁles for cand si subject to the accumulation constraints (2) and (3), to initial levels of ﬁnancial





where Λa(j,v) is the shadow price of one unit of ﬁnancial assets and Λh(j,v) is the shadow price
of one unit of human capital.
2.1 Optimality conditions
As stated in the Introduction, we focus on an interior solution. Letting H stand for the present-
value Hamiltonian function of this control problem,








+Λa(j,v){w(v)h(j,v)(1− si(j,v)) − c(j,v)+( r + m)a(j,v)},
the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions are5 (a) optimal choice of controls: ∂H/∂c =0 ,a n d
∂H/∂si =0 ; (b)ﬂow eqs.: dΛa(j,v)/dv = −∂H/∂a(j,v)anddΛh(j,v)/dv = −∂H/∂h(j,v);
(c) boundary conditions: a(j,j0) and h(j,j0) given, and (5) and (6).
Regarding the choice of controls, we have for all v ≥ j0,
e−(ρ+m)(v−j0)c(j,v)−θ = Λa(j,v) (7)
Λh(j,v)bE(j,v)1−bhi(j,v)b−1h(j,v)=Λa(j,v)w(v)h(j,v). (8)
Condition (7) says that, fora person born at time j and aliveattime j0, consumption at each future
point in time should be such that its discounted marginal utility is equal to the marginal utility of
income. The only difference in relation to the certainty case is that utility is discounted not only
because consumers are assumed to have a positive subjective discount rate but also because they
take into account that they may not reach time v.Condition (8) equalizes the value of the marginal
return to time invested in human capital (l.h.s.) to the value of the marginal return to time at work
(r.h.s.).
T u r n i n gt ot h eﬂow equations, the ﬁrst is just dΛa(j,v)/dv = −(r + m)Λa(j,v), and its
solution is immediate: Λa(j,v)=Λa(j,j0)e−(r+m)(v−j0). Using equation (8), the second ﬂow
equation simpliﬁes to dΛh(j,v)/dv = δΛh(j,v)−w(v)Λa(j,v). Now, if the economy is moving
along a BGP, w(v) can always be written as w(v)=w(j0)eg(v−j0),w h e r eg stands, as stated
previously, for the instantaneous growth rate of wages which must be equal to the rate of labour
5It is well known that the Maximum principle only provides necessary conditions for optimality. But it is easy to
show that this problem veriﬁes the so-called Arrow sufﬁciency condition – see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, pp.
107-8). The same cannot be said of other natural formulations, see McCabe (1983) for details.
6augmenting technical progress. Deﬁne the following discount rates:
R = r + m − g + δ (9)
b R = r + m − g + λ (10)
Then it is easy to show that the relationship that follows is imposed by the transversality







We can attempt to provide an intuitive explanation for this condition. Recalling that Λh(j,v)
and Λa(j,v)areshadowprices and are measured in unitsof utility, the l.h.s. of equation(11)gives
the value, in utils, of an additional unit of human capital relative to the value of an additional unit
of ﬁnancial assets. As for the r.h.s., it gives the return per period, in real terms, of an additional
unit of human capital relative to the return of an additional unit of ﬁnancial assets. Notice that R
takes into account not only that ﬁnancial assets earn interest r + m b u ta l s ot h a th u m a nc a p i t a l
depreciates at the rate δ and becomes more valuable over time at the rate g. Hence, the condition
given in equation (11) says that optimality requires that relative returns in units of utility must be
equal to relative returns in real units.
Moreover, it is also straightforward to show that in addition to (11), the transversality condi-
tion for human capital imposes that R>0 and b R>0. Both inequalities amount to lower bounds
on r and using the deﬁnitions of R and b R given in (9) and (10) they may be written as follows.
Condition 1 Two lower bounds on r:( i )r>g− m − δ and (ii) r>g− m − λ.





The numerator of the l.h.s. of (12) is the product of the human capital generated by the
marginal unit of time invested in its production and the wage rate. Dividing this by the discount
rate R yields the discounted present value of the inﬁnite stream of future labour income earned
with that marginal unit of human capital. The r.h.s. of (12) is simply the additional income
generated by the marginal unit of time spent working. Therefore, what equation (12) says is that
the two marginal returns to time allocation must be equalized at all ages.
2.2 Human assets and labour income
Solving equation (12) for invested human capital we obtain
hi(j,v)=E(j,v)(b/R)
1
1−b = h(j,j0)e−λ(v−j0)si(R), (13)
6All derivations involving more than a couple of steps of algebra are omitted from the main text for brevity. Please
see the technical appendix for details.
7We believe intuition is better provided if we do not cancel the common term w(v)h(j,v) w h i c ha p p e a r so nb o t h
sides of the equation.





From equation (13) we can see that the amount of human capital invested while on-the-job
decreases monotonically at the rate λ p e rp e r i o do v e rap e r s o n ’ sw o r k i n gl i f e .A l s o ,f o rag i v e n
age, this amount depends positively on a person’s starting human capital h(j,j0),o nφ and on b,
but negatively on R. Given the deﬁnition of R – see equation (9) – we can say that, for a given
age, the number of efﬁciency units of human capital invested depends positively on the growth
rate of wages g, but negatively on the interest rate, the mortality rate and the depreciation rate of
human capital (r, m and δ).
Substituting equation (13) in equation (3) and solving it gives
h(j,v)=h(j,j0)
h






The ﬁrst term inside the square brackets on the r.h.s. of equation (15) accounts for the fact
that human capital depreciates at the rate δ per instant of time while the second term accounts
for the effect of investment in human capital. By dividing equation (13) by equation (15) we can
determine the share of time which is spent acquiring human capital along a BGP, i.e., si(j,v)=
hi(j,v)/h(j,v). Finally, the number of efﬁciency units of human capital spent producing ﬁnal












while labour income y(j,v) is simply obtained by multiplying hy(j,v) by the wage-rate per
unit of human capital w(v).
The human capital and the productive human capital proﬁles given in equations (15) and
(16) allow for a wide range of theoretical cases. We now show that by imposing two reasonable
conditions on parameters we generate humancapital proﬁles h(j,v)and productivehuman capital
proﬁles hy(j,v) that are always hump-shaped.
Condition 2 Interior solution for si(R): 1 >φ (b/R)
1
1−b > 0.




A few comments regarding these conditions are in order. Notice that the part of Condition 2
which reads si(R) > 0 is trivially guaranteed since we have assumed above that R>0 –s e e
Condition 1. As for Condition 3, it has been derived by evaluating equation (3) at the beginning
of an individual’s working-life, when v = j0, and then forcing the derived expression to take a
positive value. As for the part of Condition 4 which reads δ>λ ,i ti sn o tn e c e s s a r ya ta l lt oo b t a i n
hump-shaped proﬁles but imposing it halves the number of cases that we need to examine. More-
over, as will be discussed in Section 7, the empirical evidence clearly supports this assumption.
8Finally, imposing a positive rate of depreciation of human capital,δ>0, is necessary to obtain
hump-shaped proﬁles.
The Ben-Porath (1967) model also produces proﬁles which are very similar to the ones above.
But his model differ from ours in two respects. He has an age-invariant constant EBP instead of
our E(j,v)1−b term and he posits that people live with certainty until a given, known age T. With






where in this case R = r−g+δ. From equation (17) it is clear that it is the fact that a person’s
lifetime horizon decreases over time that generates an optimal investment plan in human capital
that consists of accumulating most of it at young ages in order to be able to reap its beneﬁts – in
this case higher earnings – later on. As a matter of fact, if people could live until very old ages,
then the term eR(v−j−T) of (17) would be close to 0 throughout most of a person’s life and as a
consequence hi,BP(j,v) would be approximately constant throughout the same period.
By contrast, in our framework, individuals face a constant probability of death. A person who
has been lucky enough to survive until age 80 say has exactly the same life-expectancy than a
person who has just left school. Now, if λ were 0, i.e., without declining ability, this old person
should behave just like a teenager as far as hi(j,v) is concerned: from equation (13) we can see
that the best theycan do is to set aside an age-invariant amount of efﬁciency unitsofhuman capital
for investment purposes. But this behaviour would have the following consequence: a person’s
human capital would either always be increasing or decreasing, depending on whether Condition
3 were veriﬁed or not – see equation (15). There would be no way of generating a hump-shaped
proﬁle.
There is another difference between the two formulations which is worth pointing out. By
including the starting humancapital h(j,j0)in the efﬁciency termE(j,v)wederivedlog-earnings
experience proﬁles which are parallel across schooling levels, as in Mincer (1974). In other
words, the annual growth rate of labour income is independent of an individual’s education. This
implication of the model is desirable on its own since it has been broadly corroborated by the data
– see for instance Murphy and Welch (1990, p. 207, ﬁg. 2) for the U.S. case. Had we not included
h(j,j0) in the E(j,v) term, then the proﬁle for hi(j,v) would be the same irrespective of a new
worker’s starting human capital. Because of this, individuals who went to school for more and
more years should expect their human capital proﬁles to become ﬂatter and ﬂatter and ultimately
be decreasing in experience.8
8Note also that the fraction of discretionary time invested in human capital, si(j,v), is independent of h(j,j
0):i t
starts at si(R) and then decreases monotonically to b(δ − λ)/R.
9Figure 1: The impact of discount rates on individual earnings.
A case of comparative dynamics of interest to what lies ahead is the following. How do these
proﬁles change with the discount factor R, δ held constant? For simplicity, let agents facing














it is straightforward to show that their respective hy(j,v) proﬁles can only cross once, at the
experience level 1
δ−λ ln(R/b R). To the left of this point, agents facing high discount factors will
have a productive human capital higher than agents facing low discount factors; to the right of
1
δ−λ ln(R/b R), the opposite will be true. This point is illustrated in Figure 1, where earnings as
a function of years of working experience were obtained by multiplying each hy(j,v) proﬁle by
the wage rate per unit of human capital.
2.3 Consumption and ﬁnancial assets
Substituting the solution for the shadow price of ﬁnancial assets into the ﬁrst order condition with
respect to consumption gives the solution to its time proﬁle:
c(j,v)=c(j,j0)eθ−1(r−ρ)(v−j0), (18)
where c(j,j0)=Λa(j,j0)−1/θ is the choice of consumption of the new worker. First, notice
that, as ﬁrst emphasized by Yaari (1965), when life insurance is available, the growth rate of con-
sumption over time is independent of mortality patterns, although the consumption proﬁle under
uncertainty may differ markedly from the one under certainty due to different initial consumption
choices.
Second, it is well known that with perfect capital markets and no credit constraints, our op-
timizing problem allows for the complete separation of the consumption/savings decision from
investment decisions. This means that the c(j,j0)term which appears in equation (18) may in turn
10be written as being equal to c(j,j)eθ−1(r−ρ)(j0−j),w h e r ec(j,j) is consumption at birth. Hence,
the solution to the agent’s lifetime consumption path can be written as
c(j,v)=c(j,j)eθ−1(r−ρ)(v−j). (19)
What is still unknown in equation (19) is c(j,j). Therefore, we now turn to the determination
of this value as well as the proﬁles for ﬁnancial assets. During the agent’s ﬁrst s years of life,
since they have no labour income, their assets must evolve according to da(j,v)/dv = −c(j,v)+
(r + m)a(j,v). The solution for a(j,v),v a l i df o rv ∈ [j,j0],i st h e no b t a i n e db ym a k i n gu s eo f
equation (19) and condition a(j,j)=0 .9
On the other hand, by making use of the transversality condition for ﬁnancial assets – see
expression (5) – in the solution of equation (2), valid for v>j 0, we obtain an equality between the
present value of consumption (l.h.s.) and the present value of wealth (r.h.s.), from the perspective







Now, since a(j,j)=0 , the value at birth of lifetime labour income is also equal to an agent’s
wealth, which we denote ωT(j,j), ωT(j,j)=
R ∞
j0 e−(r+m)(x−j)y(j,x)dx, where the lower limit
of integration takes into account that the agent only starts working at time j0 (j + s). Using












It is straightforward to see from equation (21) that wealth at birth is increasing in g,b u t
decreasing in r and m. As expected, the detrimental effect that high rates of interest (r), high
mortality rates (m) and low rates of technical change (g) have on the incentives to accumulate
human capital on-the-job, also causes a reduction in wealth at birth. Using (19), the solution for
ﬁnancial assets when v = j0, and (21) in the lifetime constraint (20) gives
c(j,j)=[ r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)]ωT(j,j), (22)
where the following condition must be true:
Condition 5 Bounded utility: r + m>θ −1(r − ρ).
Condition 5 states that the rate of consumption growth cannot be higher than the rate of return
obtained on ﬁnancial assets. If this condition were not veriﬁed the consumer would be able to








, v ∈ [j,j
0].
10The difference between this resource constraint and the standard one is due to uncertain lifetimes. It is easy to
show that one can rewrite equation (20) explicitly in terms of the discounted expected values of consumption and
income.
11achieve unbounded utility in ﬁnite time.11 Notice that the term in square brackets on the r.h.s.
of equation (22) is the (marginal) propensity to consume out of wealth. Moreover, although this
equation has been set to time j,i ti sv a l i df o ra n yt i m et, i.e., c(j,t)=[ r+m−θ−1(r−ρ)]ωT(j,t)
for t ≥ j.12
Finally, we can use these solutions to get the explicit paths for individual assets a(j,v),b e f o r e
joining the workforce (v ≤ j0), and after it (v>j 0). These expressions are necessary when
seeking to obtain the aggregate supply of ﬁnancial resources in the economy.
3 The schooling decision
In this section we make the schooling decision endogenous. Human capital accumulation through
formal education may be at least as important as learning on-the-job. To give an example, if the
average rate of return to one year of schooling is about 8 percent, a person that spends 12 years in
formal education will see their human capital increase approximately 2.5 times. Since this paper
focuses on the determinants of human capital accumulation and inequality, it is important to be
able to also explain the schooling decision. We do this by drawing on the simple schooling model
proposed by Rosen (1977, section 4), as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) did.13
Let us begin the analysis by stating a fewassumptions and facts established in Section 2. First,
individuals derive utility uniquely from consumption. Second, the growth rate of consumption
is equal to θ−1(r − ρ), while consumption at birth, c(j,j), is proportional to lifetime wealth,











with j0 substituted for j + s, w(j + s) for w(j)egs and where Rs is deﬁned as
Rs = r + m − g.
Therate Rs can be considered as the effective discount rate associated with the schoolingdecision,
hence the subscript s. If for simplicity we ignore the direct costs of education by assuming they
are always zero, then the schooling decision turns out to be a very simple one: s is chosen to
maximize the lifetime wealth ωT(j,j) which was given above. By maximizing lifetime wealth,
the agent is implicitly maximizing consumption at birth and hence attainable consumption (and
utility) c(j,v) at each point in time.
So, let the human capital acquired by a person who spent s years in formal education be given
by
h(j,j + s)=h(j,j)ef(s),
11Similar conditions are found in the context of inﬁnitely-lived representative agents models (where m equals zero),
see for instance Barro (1990, p. S106, eq. 7).
12This can be seen by looking at eq. (20): substitute j
0 for t, denote the r.h.s. by ωT(j,t) and solve the integral on
the l.h.s.
13The Rosen model is also presented in a survey on wage determinants by Willis (1986, section 3.3). For a similar
approach which also allows for training, as we do, see Dupor, Lochner, Taber and Wittekind (1996).
12with f0(s) > 0 and f00(s) < 0. The function f measures the total return to s years of educa-
tion. Notice that a negative f00(s) assumes there are diminishing returns to years of education.14
A function that captures this is the exponential speciﬁcation posited by Bils and Klenow (2000)
and used in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000): f(s)= π1
1−π2s1−π2,w i t hπ1 > 0 and π2 ∈ (0,1).A s
will be discussed in Section 7, this speciﬁcation can produce implausible responses of schooling
choices to changes in Rs, especially for low levels of Rs. Because of this, we use the following
quadratic speciﬁcation instead, f(s)=σs − s2/2ψ, with σ,ψ > 0 and s<ψ σ . The quadratic
term s2/2ψ controls the extent to which returns to education differ from the linear Mincerian
speciﬁcation.
By taking the partial derivative of ωT(j,j) with respect to s and equalizing it to zero we get
the optimal choice of education: f0(s)= Rs. This condition simply says that optimality requires
equalizing the marginal return to schooling (l.h.s.) to the effective discount rate (r.h.s.). Solving
explicitly for s gives
s∗ = ψ(σ − Rs), (24)
w h e r ew ea s s u m eσ> Rs and the asterisk is used to denote an optimal choice. The optimal
choice of education depends positively on the initial return to schooling, σ,a n dt h er a t eo ft e c h n i -
cal change, negatively on the interest rate and the mortality rate. Moreover, s∗ depends positively
on ψ since a higher ψ reduces the extent to which the returns to schooling deviate from the linear
Mincerian model.
4 Aggregation
In this section we do the following. First, we sum individual productive human capital across
cohorts to obtain the aggregate supply of productive human capital Hs
y(t). We proceed similarly
for individual ﬁnancial assets to obtain the aggregate supply of ﬁnancial resources in the economy
Ks(t). Finally, taking for simplicity the interest rate as exogenous, we brieﬂy discuss two results
that can be obtained with the analytical expression for Hs
y(t). The ﬁrst result says that, under
favorable conditions such as low interest rates and low mortality rates, learning on-the-job may
more than double the basic productive human capital that results from schooling decisions; the
second says that, provided r is greater than the sum of the rate of population growth (n) and the
rate of technical change (g), Hy(t) will be decreasing in r but increasing in g.
Let us assume, ﬁrst, that new individuals are born in each period and second, that the age
structure of the population is stable over time. Letting e b (e b>0)s t a n df o rt h ef r a c t i o no ft h e
population which consists of newborns at each instant of time, and n for the rate of population
growth per instant of time, in equilibrium it must be the case that e b = m + n.15.
14Evidence for this can be found in Psacharopoulos (1994) or Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
15Let the population at time zero be normalized to 1 and let us assume it has been growing at the rate n ever since.
Then the number of newborns at time t will be equal to e be
nt. On the other hand, given an age-independent mortality
rate, me
nt individuals will also die at that instant. Hence the net growth of the population at t must be equal to
(e b − m)e
nt and this renders e b − m = n, as stated in the main text. Notice also that we are allowing for declining
populations, but in those cases the assumption e b>0 imposes that |n| <m .
13Let L(j,t) stand for the number of people born at time j who are still alive at time t and
L(t)=ent standforthepopulationattimet.S i n c eL(j,j)=( m+n)enj andsincetheprobability
that a person born at time j is still alive at time t is e−m(t−j),w ec a nw r i t e
L(j,t)=( m + n)e−m(t−j)+nj. (25)
Under the assumption that the human capital levels of different workers are perfect substitutes





Now, deﬁne the following discount rates,
∆1 = m + n + δ ∆2 = m + n + λ





1−b, and for convenience, let us rewrite equation (16) as follows
hy(j,t)=ef(s)
h




with v substituted for t, j0 for j + s and h(j,j0) for ef(s).T h e nHy(t) can be obtained by
substituting equations (25) and (27) into equation (26), and integrating. Aggregating physical
capital proceeds along the same lines but it involves more complex expressions since we have to
make a distinction between those agents alive at t that are yet to join the workforce and the others.












K(t)=w(t)h(t,t)L(t,t)e−(m+n)s+f(s) {Ψ1(r)Ψ2(r) − Ψ3(r)} (29)
where R0 > 0 is necessary in order to guarantee that aggregate physical capital at time t takes
a ﬁnite value and Ψ1(r), Ψ2(r) and Ψ3(r) are functions of r as well as other parameters and
endogenous variables.17 Since previous conditions guarantee that Ψ1(r),Ψ3(r) > 0,a g g r e g a t e
physical capital will only be positive if Ψ2(r) > 0. The condition on R0 amounts to an upper
bound on r. It is also possible to show that when δ>λ , then r>θ (g −λ)+ρ.W er e w r i t et h e s e
two bounds below as two conditions:








































14Condition 6 Upper bound on r: r<ρ+ θ(m + n + g).
Condition 7 Another lower bound on r: r>θ (g − λ)+ρ.
Notice that Condition 6 coincides with Ψ2(r) > 0 whenever s =0 , while Condition 7
will in many cases be more stringent than the one imposed by Condition 1( ii).B e f o r e w e
proceed to determine the equilibrium of this economy, we brieﬂy discuss two partial equilibrium
results that are easily obtained by making use of the analytical expression for Hy(t) given above
and assuming, for simplicity, that r is exogenously given. The ﬁrst relates to the importance
of learning on-the-job in human capital formation. Under favorable circumstances (e.g., low
rates of interest and low mortality rates), learning on-the-job may double or more than double
the basic productive human capital that results from schooling decisions; while in less favorable
circumstances, it may play a relatively small role in accounting for the level of Hy(t).18
The second result is obtained by differentiating Hy(t) with respect to (r − g). First notice,
that everything else equal, the choice of schooling years that maximizes society’s Hy(t) is given
by f0(s)=m+n. Provided the interest rateisabove n+g, the optimal schooling choice made by
each individual, s∗, will always lie to the left of that maximum. But since s∗ depends negatively
on r − g (see Section 3), this means that increases in the interest rate r or decreases in the rate of
technical change g will reduce Hy(t) via lower schooling choices. Moreover, and again as long
as r>n+ g, this reduction in Hy(t) will be made more severe by lower investments in learning
on-the-job as well.
5 Equilibrium
This section is structured as follows. We begin by solving for the demand for factors Hd
y(t) and
Kd(t) by the typical ﬁrm. Then we proceed to compute the steady-state general equilibrium of
this economy. We deﬁne equilibrium as an interest rate r∗; an allocation {Kd(t),H d
y(t),Y(t)}
for the typical ﬁrm; a set of allocations {c(j,t),a(j,t)} for the typical individual not in the labour
force, j ∈ (t-s,t); and a set of allocations {c(j,t),s i(j,t),a(j,t),h y(j,t)} for the typical worker,
j ≤ t-s such that, for all time t: (a) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given prices; (b) individuals maximize
expected lifetime utility subject to human capital and ﬁnancial assets constraints at given prices;
(c)the schooling choice sand the population structure are constant; (d)allmarkets clear, Hd
y(t)=
Hs
y(t), Kd(t)=Ks(t), C(t)+I(t)=Y (t).
But since the equation that determines the equilibrium interest rate is highly nonlinear and
can in principle have many solutions, we next develop a diagrammatic exposition that shows that
equilibrium is unique for reasonable parameter conﬁgurations and can be seen as the intersection
point of two curves, as in the phase diagrams of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model (henceforth
simply Ramsey model) and the Blanchard model. Then, to gain intuition for general equilibrium







on the r.h.s. of equation (28). For example,
when m + n = .02; δ = .04; λ = .01; R = .1; b = .5; si(R)=.25,t h i st e r mi s19.4 whereas the term 1/∆1
associated with schooling is 16.6; increasing m+n to .04 and decreasing si(R) to .20 reduces the learning on-the-job
term to 6 and the 1/∆1 term to 12.5.
15effects and comparative statics results, we present two special cases of it. In Section 5.1 we
focus on the impact of n, m, g, ρ and θ on r∗ when there is no endogenous human capital
accumulation (the Blanchard model). In Section 5.2, ﬁrst, we introduce schooling effects, by
making the schooling choice s exogenous (basic extension of the Blanchard model), then by
making s endogenous (the Kalemli-Ozcan-Ryder-Weil model, henceforth KRW model); second,
we introduce learning on-the-job effects.
As mentioned in Section 2, the ﬂow of ﬁnal output at t is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production function, Y (t)=K(t)α [A(t)Hy(t)]
1−α, where we recall that A(t) is an index of
labour augmenting technical progress which grows at rate g; K(t) is physical capital, which must
be in equilibrium equal to aggregate ﬁnancial assets; and Hy(t) is the economy’s stock of human
capital that is allocated to production.
Suppose the economy is moving along a BGP. Then each ﬁrm pays w(t) per unit of human
capital and r + δk per unit of rented physical capital, where r stands for the riskless market rate
of interest and δk is the rate of depreciation of physical capital. Since the typical ﬁrm faces no
adjustmentcosts, andgiven that we assume itoperates under perfectcompetition, itwillmaximize
its proﬁts by equalizing at each point in time the marginal rate of technical substitution between
K(t) and Hy(t) to the ratio of their prices. This condition can be written as
αw(t)Hy(t)=( 1− α)(r + δk)K(t)
By substituting equations (28) and (29) into the previous expression, we obtain an equation in
r only. This equation is not particularly instructive and must, in general, be solved numerically.
This is why we now turn to a diagrammatic exposition.19 Let b x(t) denote aggregate variable
X(t) expressed in efﬁciency units of productive human capital, i.e., b x(t)=X(t)/[A(t)Hy(t)].
Equilibrium may then be obtained as the intersection point of two curves on the space (b k,b c),a si n
the Ramsey model and the Blanchard model. There is a major difference though: the expressions
that follow are only valid along a BGP and should not be seen as isoclines of a phase diagram on
the space (b k,b c),s i n c eHy(t) is endogenous. 20
First, we have the economy’s resource constraint, which says that (gross) output must be equal
to consumption plus (gross) investment. In the steady state,
.
b k =0and this implies the following
relationship between b c and b k:
b c = b kα − (n + g + δk)b k =[ ( r + δk)/α − (n + g + δk)]b k. (30)
This constraint is the same as the one found in the Ramsey model: on the space (b k,b c),t h e
19Notice that an equilibrium with interior solutions, reasonable earnings proﬁles, etc., is not guaranteed for unre-
stricted conﬁgurations of parameters. For example, we cannot be sure whether or not si(R), the time spent acquiring
human capital, lies in the unit interval. This issue arises in many similar models. See for instance Benhabib and Perli
(1994) for a study of the restrictions on parameter values that deliver a unique interior solution in the Lucas (1988)
model.
20When one assumes that human capital accumulation decisions, from schooling to the fraction of time used to learn




b k =0is concave, starts at 0 and reaches a maximum when f0(b k)=n + g + δk
(golden rule). So what makes our model differ from the Ramsey model must be solely attributed
to the
.
b c =0constraint, to which we now turn. Differentiating aggregate consumption, C(t)=
R t
−∞ c(j,t)L(j,t)dj, with respect to time gives:
.
C(t)=θ−1(r − ρ)C(t) − mC(t)+c(t,t)L(t,t), (31)
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of equation (31) captures the fact that individual consumption for
those already alive grows at the rate θ−1(r − ρ) per unit of time; the second that a fraction m of
the population dies per unit of time; the third that L(t,t) agents are newly born at every instant
of time and each one of them consumes c(t,t). It can be shown that the term c(t,t)L(t,t) can
be expressed as a function of aggregate variables C(t) and K(t). Using this result in the last
equation and writing it in efﬁciency units, one obtains another relationship between b c and b k along
the BGP (where
.
b c =0 ):
b c =
£
r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¤b k
1 − R0 £
e(r−n−g)sΨ3(r)Ψ1(r)−1 +( e(r−n−g)s − 1)/(r − n − g)
¤ (32)
Recall that s is a one-to-one function of r and r is, in turn, a one-to-one function of b k,s ob c in
equation (32) is a function of b k only.21 Equilibrium on the space (b k,b c) is given by the intersection
of the two curves deﬁned by equations (30) and (32). We now proceed to discuss special cases of
this general model in order to gain intuition for its general equilibrium properties.
5.1 The Blanchard model
We start with the seminal Blanchard (1985) model, where it is assumed there is no investment in
human capital and the population consists only of workers, so Hy(t)=H(t). For expositional
reasons, we set δ =0 . In this special case, equation (32) simpliﬁes to22
b c =
¡





r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¢
1 − R0/(m + n)
b k. (33)
Figure 2 illustrates on the space (b k,b c)howthe Blanchard equilibriumdiffers fromthe Ramsey
one (with zero population growth). Equilibrium in the Ramsey model, at point ER,i sg i v e nb y
the intersection of the concave
.
b k =0curve with a vertical
.
b cR =0curve. By contrast, when
θ ≥ 1 (the relevant case according to the empirical evidence, see Section 7), the
.
b cB =0curve of
the Blanchard model is convex, starting at the origin and then gradually approaching the vertical
asymptote that corresponds to the higher bound for b k. However, only points which lie to the right
of the lower bound for b k (b k in the ﬁgure) should be considered as candidates for equilibrium. In
Figure 2, the Blanchard equilibrium is represented by point EB.
21We do not make this dependence explicit in what follows to avoid cumbersome notation.
22Set to zero the following values: si(R), λ,a n ds.
17Figure 2: The impact of the arrival of new families (point EB) and students (point EK) on the Ramsey equilibrium
(point ER).
As for comparative statics, inspection of equations (30) and (33) shows that increases in n,
and g shift the
.
b k =0curve downward; while increases in n, g, m, ρ and θ shift the
.
b cB =0curve
upward. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate in the Blanchard model depends positively on the
following parameters: n, m, g, ρ and θ.
The way parameters g, ρ, θ impact on the equilibrium interest rate is qualitatively similar in
the Ramsey model and the Blanchard model. This statement can be made more precise once the




θ−1(r − ρ) − g
¢
b c − (m + n)
¡
r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¢b k (34)
The rate of arrival of consumers per unit of time is equal to the birth rate m+n. As this arrival





θ−1(r − ρ) − g
¤
b c.23 Therefore, for very low birth rates, the two models
produce essentially the same results.
As the arrival rate of consumers moves away from zero, so grows the importance of mortality
and population growth rates in the determination of the Blanchard equilibrium. This can be seen
by looking at the b k-term on the r.h.s. of equation (34). On the one hand, new consumers arrive
in the economy at the rate m + n per unit of time. On the other hand, the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth for any individual, including newborns, is given by r + m − θ−1(r − ρ).
So what this b k-term captures is the depressing effect that these new consumers, born without any
ﬁnancial wealth, have on the growth of b c. This is why, for a given capital stock b k,
.
b cB =0requires
23Recall that we have shown above that the equation of motion for b k (the economy’s resource constraint) is identical
in the two models. The insight that what is crucial for this equivalence is that m + n → 0 is due to Weil (1989).
18consumption per effective worker to increase with mortality and population growth rates: a higher
m increases both the arrival rate of new consumers and their propensity to consume; ah i g h e rn
increases the arrival rate of new consumers. Both effects shift the
.
b cB =0curve upward.24
5.2 Schooling and learning on-the-job effects
To gain intuition for the effects of schooling, consider ﬁrst what might be called a KRW model
with exogenous schooling. That is, relax the assumption that the economy is inhabited by workers
only and assume instead that s is positive, although exogenously determined. Now, term R0/∆1
of equation (33) should be substituted by a new term that turns out to be increasing in s.T h e
qualitative impact on equilibrium of exogenous schooling is also illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Curve
.
b cK =0of this KRW model with exogenous schooling lies, for all admissible values for b k,
everywhere above the
.
b cB =0curve of the Blanchard model. This is what we should expect:
for a given capital per effective worker,
.
b c =0now requires consumption per effective worker
to increase with the fraction of people not in the labour force since students, by drawing their
consumption from existing resources, exert downward pressure on the growth of b c.25 Equilibrium
in this KRW model with exogenous schooling is represented by point EK in ﬁgure 2.
What happens when schooling is endogenous? We have just shown that the equilibrium inter-
est rate in a KRW model with exogenous schooling is an increasing function of s. Let us denote
this relationship by r1(s). On the other hand, optimality in the KRW model of schooling choice
requires equalization of the marginal return to schooling and the effective discount rate, .i.e.,
f0(s)= Rs.26 But this equation makes the optimal choice of schooling years a negative function
of the interest rate. Denoting the inverse of this last relationship by r2(s), one can see that the
general equilibrium of the KRW model can be represented by the point {s∗,r∗} where the two
curves r1(s) and r2(s) cross.
Figures 3 to 5 show three cases of comparative statics in the KRW model which are also
relevant to our more complex model.27 For all of them, we have used the quadratic speciﬁcation
for f(s) that we proposed in Section 3, i.e., f(s)=σs − s2/2ψ.H e n c er2(s) is simply a line,
r2(s)=σ + g − m − s/ψ, that shifts rightward as the learning technology improves (higher σ’s
and ψ’s), as technical progress accelerates, and as mortality declines.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of a higher mortality rate on the long run equilibrium in the
KRW model. Initially the economy is at point E. A higher m has a direct negative impact on
each individual’s choice of schooling since it directly affects their effective discount rate. This
is represented by a downward shift of curve r2(s). But, for a given rate of population growth, a
higher m must translate into a higher birth rate (recall that b = m+n) and a younger population.
24Notice, however, that it is not true that changes in m must have a larger impact on r
∗ than changes in n: although
an increase in m has a double upward impact on the
.
b cB =0curve, it does not change the
.
b k =0curve, whereas an
increase in n has a downward impact on the
.
b k =0curve as well as an upward impact on the
.
b cB =0curve.
25However, the difference between term R
0/∆1 and the new term tends to zero as r approaches its upper bound,
i.e., as R
0 → 0 ( t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt ob k → b k).
26See Section 3.
27Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) do not present a diagrammatic exposition of their model but they do provide an
algebraic proof of the existence and uniqueness of the steady-state when f(s)=l n ( s) (ibid, Appendix A, pp. 19-20).
19Figure 3: The direct and indirect impact of a higher mortality rate on the KRW equilibrium.
For a given s, the effect of these additional arrivals of young people in the economy is to put
upward pressure on the interest rate. This is represented by the upward shift of curve r1(s).T h e
economy will ultimately converge to the new equilibrium point En, with lower schooling than
before (s∗
n <s ∗). However, in theory at least, one cannot say whether or not the new rate of
interest lies above (as in the ﬁgure) or below the old one.
Figure 4: The indirect impact of a higher population growth rate on the KRW equilibrium.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of a higher population growth rate. A higher n does not have
a direct impact on schooling choices, hence r2(s) does not shift. The negative impact of a higher
n on schooling is entirely accounted for by its upward pressure on the economy’s interest rate.
In the new equilibrium, schooling years will be lower than before because the equilibrium rate of
interest has gone up.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of an improvement in the learning technology as captured by an
increase in σ. In the new equilibrium, both schooling years and the rate of interest will be bigger
than before.
20Figure 5: The positive direct effect of a better learning technology on the KRW equilibrium.
We now turn to endogenous learning on-the-job effects. Assume the population consists en-
tirely of workers, so that s =0 . It is possible to show that equilibrium in this economy will be
unique for all reasonable parameter conﬁgurations by using a similar diagram to the ones given
in ﬁgures 3 to 5. Notice that the crucial human capital decision in this case is si(R), the fraction
of time that a new worker invests in human capital. Now, on the one hand, r∗ is an increasing
function of the fraction of exogenously given investment si(R) because of the following: when
investment on-the-job increases, there is an additional fraction of existing human capital that is
not producing but still consuming; this puts downward pressure on the growth of consumption
per effective worker, so now the
.
b c =0curve will lie, once again for all admissible values for b k,
everywhere above the
.
b cB =0of the simple Blanchard model. On the other hand, the optimal
choice of si(R) is a negative function of the interest rate. So equilibrium is given by the inter-
section point of these two relationships on the space {si(R),r}. Moreover, a higher m will have
both a direct and an indirect negative impact on on the optimal choice of si(R), whereas a higher
n will only have an indirect negative impact on it.
Finally, we summarize this discussion by brieﬂy commenting on a few characteristics of the
model with endogenous schooling and learning on-the-job. First, the ways mortality rates and
population growth rates impact on equilibrium in this model and the Blanchard one are very simi-
lar. Increases in these rates translate into higher arrival rates of consumers in the economy per unit
of time. These new consumers, born without any ﬁnancial wealth, will use resources that could
have been used to increase capital per effective worker. Moreover, the lower the lifetime horizon
(high mortality rates), the stronger this depressing effect on capital per effective worker, since
new consumers will have higher marginal propensities to consume. Second, increases in school-
ing and/or learning on-the-job following an (exogenous) increase in the efﬁciency of learning will
be partially crowded out by higher interest rates.
6 Heterogeneous ability
While the importance of the number of years of formal education and working experience as
predictors of earnings was the focus of Mincer (1974, ch. 5), there is now a voluminous literature
thatextends hishuman capitalearningsfunctionto takeinto account other factors. Thereasons for
21this are well known: individuals that are apparently equivalent in terms of education, experience,
occupation may earn very different amounts. It is also widely agreed that this residual variability
in earnings may to some extent be explained by differences in cognitive skills (e.g., IQ or aptitude
test scores) and family background (e.g., education of a parent or sibling). Here, we aggregate
these differences into one index which we call ability and we take differences in this ability index
as being exogenously determined. We also assume that individuals learn their ability at birth.
Let a person’s ability ε be a random draw from a time-invariant distribution Gε(ε) with sup-
port [εL,ε H] on R and probability density function gε(ε). Regarding the impact of ability on
schooling, we assume that ψ is a positive function of ability, i.e., f(s,ε)=σs− s2/2ψ(ε), with
ψ0(ε) > 0.T h i sg i v e ss∗(ε)=ψ(ε)(σ−Rs). This formulation implies that the change in s∗ in
responseto achange intheeffectivediscountrate Rs is increasing in ability while at the same time
the elasticity of s∗ to Rs is invariant to ability: if Rs increases by 1 percent, the schooling choice
of both low and high ability people will decrease by −Rs/(σ−Rs) percent. For transparency, we
rewrite the crucial condition below:
Condition 8 Spence-Mirrlees condition: ψ0(ε) > 0.
The name given to the condition reﬂects the fact that the marginal return to education is
increasing in ability (∂2f(s,ε)/∂s∂ε > 0). We posit the simplest possible function for ψ(ε),
ψ(ε)=ψε, with ψ>0. With this speciﬁcation, optimal schooling turns out to be linear in
ability:
s∗(ε)=ψ(σ − Rs)ε (35)
Moreover, the total return to s∗(ε) years of education is also linear in ability, f(s∗(ε)) =
ψ
2(σ2−R2
s)ε. So the starting human capital of the new worker with ability ε, h(j,j + s∗(ε)) =
h(j,j)ef(s∗(ε)), may be seen as a r. v., denoted H∗ for short, which is a monotonically increasing
function of the r. v. ε. Likewise, wealth at birth for an individual with ability ε m a yb es e e na s
a r. v., denoted ω∗
T say, which is a function of the r. v. ε. It is easy to show that we can obtain
expressions for the densities of H∗ and ω∗
T from the density of ε.
We now turn to the changes to the model that result from heterogeneity. In a nutshell, they
are minimal. First, the analyses of Sections 2 and 3 should be seen as applying to a type-ε indi-
vidual. To reﬂect this, a new argument should be added to several variables, such as in h(j,v,ε),













with j0(ε)=j + s∗(ε). Second, aggregation must be done across ages and ability levels.
S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h ed i s t r i b u t i o nGε(ε) and therefore its density gε(ε) are stable over time,
the number of type-ε individuals born at time j who are still alive at time time t is given by








where the inside integral is identical to the Hy(t) of equation (28), except that s should be
substituted by s∗(ε).
7C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section, we calibrate the model with heterogeneous agents for the U.S. growth observations
ofthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury. Tables1to3givethevalueschosenforeachparameter:
Table 1 presents general/macro parameters; Table 2 focuses on the parameters associated with
learning on-the-job; while Table 3 covers the parameters associated with the schooling decision
as well as with heterogeneous ability.28
Turning to Table 1, we rely on the King and Rebelo (1999, pp. 953-4) calibration of the basic
real business cycle model for the parameters r, g, α,a n dδk. There is no consensus as to the ap-
propriate value for θ. Surveying many microeconomic studies, Browning, Hansen and Heckman
(1999, p. 552) conclude that if constancy of this elasticity is imposed across the population, then
there is no strong evidence against the view that θ is slightly above 1. We therefore use logarith-
mic utility (θ =1 )a n dθ =2 .29 As for ρ, the subjective discount rate, it is a free parameter. It is
the last value to be set and it is chosen to ensure the model produces the interest rate given above.
The two values given in the table correspond to the two values for θ.
Parameter Description Value
r interest rate .065
n population growth rate .012
m mortality rate 1/70
g rate of technical change .016
θ inverse of the elasticity of substitution 1;2
ρ subjective discount rate .0335;.002
α share of income received by physical capital 1/3
δk depreciation rate of physical capital .1
Table 1: Calibration - General Parameters
As for demographics, the U.S. population was about 157.8 million in 1950 and 285 million
in 2000. Assuming continuous compounding, n solves 285 = 157.8e50n. The other parameter
value that we have to determine is the mortality rate. Given that a constant mortality rate implies
a life expectancy of 1/m, we can use our knowledge of the latter to calculate the former. The
28A more detailed discussion of the calibration procedure is available from the author upon request.
29The value 2 has been used several times as the benchmark case – see Trostel (1993, p. 336, note 10) for references.
23chosen value reﬂects the fact that our model ignores pre-schooling years.30
Choosing the parameter values of the human capital production function – see Table 2 –
requires some judgement. Firstly, there are no estimates of our model since it includes an age
effect through λ which has never been taken into account as well as permanent effect of schooling
through φh(j,j0) – see equation (4). There are a few estimates though of the simpler speciﬁcation
dh(j,v)/dv = EBPhi(j,v)b − δh(j,v) in a partial equilibrium setting which also estimate the
interest rate – see Heckman (1976, p. S33, Table 1), Haley (1976, p. 1233, Table III) and the U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1960 study reported in Browning et al. (1999, p. 585, Table 2.3). Secondly,
the chosen parameterization must allow the discount rate R to change within a reasonable range
without generating implausible human capital proﬁles. A value for b of .5accomplishes this while
still being very close to the lower estimate for b found in Haley (1976, p. 1233, Table III) as well
as the estimate of the U.S. Bureau of the Census as reported by Browning et al. (1999, p. 585,
Table 2.3). The value for δ is set as in Trostel (1993).
Parameter Description Value
b captures the extent of diminishing returns to hi(j,v) .5
δ depreciation rate of human capital .04
λ rate that captures the effect of ageing on learning ability .01
φ efﬁciency parameter associated with learning .01497
Table 2: Calibration - Learning on-the-job Parameters
As for λ, we draw on the work of Avolio and Waldman (1994) on variations on ability across
the working life span that may be related to factors such as race, education and occupational
type. Avolio and Waldman (1994) present in a table and ﬁgures the mean General Aptitude Test
Battery scores (collected from 1970 to 1984) on nine ability factors for black, hispanic and white
Americans by six age groupings. This produces twenty-seven age ability proﬁles. The major
conclusion that we can draw from their study is that ability factors start declining from the early
twenties onwards but they do so at mild rates. Using the above mentioned proﬁles, we obtained 1
percent per year as a rough estimate for λ.
The only variable that remains to be determined in order to produce human capital proﬁles
is φ. We draw on estimates by Krueger and Pischke (1992) that use the March 1989 Current
Population Survey (CPS) to obtain a value for φ for two reasons. First, their estimates produce
proﬁles which are broadly similar to the actual proﬁles calculated by Murphy and Welch (1990)
using CPS’s from 1964 to 1988, second, Krueger and Pischke (1992) also produce estimates of
the return to schooling, a number which we also make use of in this exercise.
These authors estimate a standard Mincerian earnings regression of the type lny = α1 +
α2s+γ1x+γ2
2x+η,w h e r ey is weekly earnings, s is the number of years in full-time education,
x is the number of potential years of working experience, and η is an error term.31 Their point
30Life expectancy at birth for the U.S. was 68.2 years in 1950 and 77 years in 2000. The round number we have
chosen is approximately equal to life expectancy at ages 5 or 6 for the period from the mid-80s onwards – see Arias
(2004, p. 22, Table 12).
31They also add a dummy indicating gender but that is immaterial for this discussion (ibid., Table 2a, column 5).
24estimates are α1 = .093, γ1 = .032 and γ2 = −.00048.A v a l u e f o r φ equal to .01497 was
found to be the one which produced both a peak age and peak value closer to those implied by the
quadratic estimates of Krueger and Pischke (1992).32
Turning to the education parameters – see Table 3. As an estimate of the average number
of school years of the typical American we use, for consistency, the median value for the year
1989, the same year used to estimate the experience earnings proﬁle, hence s =1 2 .7.33 As for ψ
and σ, ﬁrst, let ε stand for the average ability of the American population and set it, without any
loss of generality, to unity. Then if we take the s schooling years given above as resulting from
equalizing f0(s) to Rs,a ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n3 ,w em u s th a v eσ −s∗/ψ =Rs. This amounts to one
equation in two unknowns, ψ and σ. The way we proceeded was to draw on the estimates of Bils
and Klenow (2000) to obtain a reasonable value for ψ a n dt h e nw eu s e di ti nt h el a s te q u a t i o nt o
get the value of σ.
Parameter Description Value
σ rate of return to the ﬁrst schooling year .1264
ψ captures the extent to which returns to edu. decrease with y. of school. 200
s average years of school completed by a worker 12.7
ε average ability 1
εL lowest ability .5
εH highest ability 1.5
κ1 coefﬁcient of ε2 in the density function of ability g(ε) −6
κ2 coefﬁcient of ε in g(ε)1 2
κ3 constant term in g(ε) −4.5
Table 3: Calibration - Schooling and Ability Parameters
Figure 6 represents the same optimal schooling choice under our speciﬁcation and the Bils
and Klenow (2000) one. The horizontal line gives the value of Rs; the black downward sloping
line shows the relationship between the number of schooling years and the marginal return to
schooling implied by our speciﬁcation, f0(s)=.1264−s/200; while the dashed curve shows the
one implied by a Bils and Klenow (2000) speciﬁcation, f0(s)=.276s−.58. It should be obvious
from the graph that, at low levels of Rs, the second speciﬁcation implies schooling responses to
changes in Rs that may be implausible.
32In order to see whether or not the year 1989 was representative of the calibration period, we also used the estimates
for γ1 (.042)a n dγ2 (.00061) which Krueger and Pischke (1992, Table 2b) obtained for a sample of men only. The
men’s proﬁle peaks at about the same x (33.6) as the two-sexes’ proﬁle given above but it reaches a higher value for
hy(x
∗), about 2. By inspection of the proﬁles obtained in the Murphy and Welch (1990, p. 207, ﬁg. 2) study of (white)
men, we conclude that our estimate is reasonable.
33This is not signiﬁcantly different from the mean. Calculations by Jones (2002, p. 225) produce a mean of 12.5
years for 1993.
25Figure 6: Optimal schooling choice with the exponential speciﬁcation and the quadratic speciﬁcation.
As for the extreme values for ability, εH is chosen to produce an optimal s of 19 years, the
doctoral level say. This gives εH ≈ 1.5. Then we impose symmetry around average ability (ε =
1), so that εL ≈ .5. The resulting optimal schooling choice for εL is 6.35 years. For simplicity,
we posit a quadratic in ε: g(ε)=κ1ε2 + κ2ε + κ3.34 This function has to verify the following
conditions:(i) g(ε) ≥ 0 for all ε ∈ [εL,ε H] and
R εH
εL g(ε)dε =1 ; (ii) ε =
R εH
εL εg(ε)dε =1 ; (iii)
g(εH)=0 . Condition (i) guarantees that g(ε) is a density, condition (ii) that average ability is
the one arbitrarily chosen, while condition (iii) captures the idea that the percentage of people
close to the extremes of the distribution should be small. The three together pin down the values
of κ1, κ3 and κ3.
8 Simulations
In this section we analyze the impact of demographic factors on levels of endogenous variables as
well as on measures of inequality along the BGP. Tables 4 and 5 report the effects of, respectively,
mortality rates and population growth rates. The notation of the ﬁrst column of each table requires
a few explanations. We assume throughout that we stand at time t =0 ,s oA(t), the index of
technical change, is equal to 1, and we drop term t in the expressions below. Recall also that
the population at time 0 has been normalized to unity. Variables hy, k and y are, respectively,
productive human capital, physical capital and output, all in per worker terms. The next four
variables have already been introduced before: S
∗ is the average school attainment; s∗
i(R) is the
fraction of time that a new worker invests in human capital; H∗
y is the average productive human
capital of a new worker and ω∗
T is their corresponding wealth at birth.35 Finally, SD stands
for standard deviation, while CV stands for the coefﬁcient of variation (standard deviation over
mean), a measure of inequality that is Lorenz-consistent – see for instance Ray (1998, ch. 6).
34Positing a density function g(ε) which is a polynomial in ε makes integration across ability straightforward:
calculations amount to integrating a function of the type e
aεg(ε) with respect to ε (a being a constant).
35We use an asterisk to indicate that these variables relate to optimal decisions.
26We begin with the impact of mortality rates – see table 4. The values shown in the second
column are those obtained for the calibrated U.S. economy. The values reported in the third and
fourthcolumns, respectively, arethenewequilibriumvaluesresulting frommortalityratesof1/55
and 1/40, respectively, when θ =1 . The numbers in parenthesis measure changes in relation to
the benchmark economy (second column). So, for instance, a value for y equal to −10 shown in
parenthesis means that income per worker in this case is 10% lower than the one of the calibrated
U.S. economy. The ﬁfth and sixth columns repeat the simulations of the same mortality changes
for the case θ =2 .











r. 065 .0673 (+4) .0708 (+9) .0695 (+7) .0758 (+17)
Rs .063 .0695(+10) .0798 (+27) .0717 (+14) .0848 (+35)
hy 3.18 2.89 (−9) 2.43 (−24) 2.79 (−12) 2.21 (−31)
k 9.12 8.13 (−11) 6.62 (−27) 7.68 (−16) 5.78 (−36)
y 4.51 4.08 (−10) 3.39 (−25) 3.91 (−13) 3.05 (−32)
S
∗ 12.71 1 .5( −9) 9.4( −26) 11 (−13) 8.4( −34)
s∗
i(R) .35 .31 (−11) .26 (−26) .30 (−14) .24 (−31)
H∗
y 2.25 2.19 (−3) 2 (−11) 2.15 (−4) 1.88 (−16)
ω∗
T 21.75 18.19 (−16) 14.04 (−35) 17.14 (−21) 12.59 (−42)
SD(S∗)2 .84 2.56 (−10) 2.1( −26) 2.46 (−13) 1.88 (−34)
CV(S∗) .22 .22 (0) .22 (0) .22 (0) .22 (0)
SD(H∗
y) .61 .55 (−10) .43 (−30) .53 (−13) .37 (−39)
CV(H∗
y) .27 .25 (−7) .22 (−19) .24 (−11) .20 (−26)
SD(ω∗
T)1 .96 1.34 (−32) .69 (−65) 1.17 (−43) .50 (−74)
CV(ω∗
T) .09 .07 (−22) .05 (−44) .068 (−24) .04 (−56)
SD(hy)1 .05 .87 (−17) .61 (−42) .815 (−22) .51 (−51)
CV(hy) .33 .30 (−9) .25 (−24) .29 (−12) .23 (−30)
Table 4: The impact of mortality on human capital decisions and inequality
The ﬁrst thing to notice about table 4 is that the effective discount rate Rs increases signif-
icantly with mortality rates. This arises because m impacts on Rs both directly, and indirectly
through the equilibrium interest rate. This explains why Rs when m equals 1/40 is about 30
percent higher than in the benchmark case. Second, these differences translate into signiﬁcant
differences in schooling and investment on-the-job choices. For instance, for the case θ =2 ,a
27reduction in life expectancy of 30 years (from 70 to 40 years) reduces average school attainment
by 34 percent or 4.3 years in absolute terms; it also reduces the fraction of time that new workers
s p e n di n v e s t i n gi nt h e i rh u m a nc a p i t a lb y31 percent. Third, high mortality rates have a strong
negative impact on output per worker because they reduce both productive human capital and
physical capital per worker.
We now turn to the impact of mortality rates on inequality within cohorts. Recall that the
schooling choices of high ability individuals are more responsive (in absolute terms, not in per-
centage terms) to changes in the effective discount rate than those of low ability individuals. It
follows that the standard deviation of S∗,f o rag i v e nc o h o r t ,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nRs.T h i s e f f e c t i s
illustrated in Figure 7. The three downward sloping lines represent the marginal returns to years
of schooling of the lowest ability (L), median ability (M) and highest ability individuals (H) in
the economy, whereas the two horizontal dashed lines show the effective discount rates that they
would face under conditions of high mortality (High Rs) and low mortality (Low Rs).
As can be seen from the picture, high mortality rates, by increasing Rs, reduce inequality in
schoolingchoices. Thisdemographiceffecton inequalityislargeinoursimulations. Forexample,
when life expectancy drops to 40 years, SD(S∗) decreases by 26 percent (case θ =1 )o r3 4
percent(caseθ =2 ).B u ti fw ec o m pu t eth eu ni tf re em e a su r eCV(S∗), mortality changesturn out
to have no impact on inequality. This is because our speciﬁcation implies that CV(S∗)=CV(ε)
and the distribution of ability is unchanged.
Figure 7: The impact of high mortality rates on inequality in terms of years of schooling.
However, boththe SDand the CV of the productive human capital of new workers H∗
y aswell
as of their wealth at birth ω∗
T decrease signiﬁcantly with mortality rates. When these are high,
the dispersion in S∗ is relatively small. Since high ability individuals make schooling choices that
are not very different from those made by low ability individuals, the dispersion in their starting
productive human capital is also relatively small. This explains why high mortality reduces in-
equality in H∗
y. High mortality has an even stronger impact on inequality in wealth at birth because
cash-ﬂows earned at different stages in a person’s life are now more heavily discounted.
Earnings inequality across cohorts also decreases considerably with mortality rates – see the
28last two rows of table 4. There are two main reasons for this. First, as stated above, high mortality
reduces the dispersion in H∗
y. Second, high mortality reduces directly, and indirectly through its
effect on r, the incentives to invest in learning on-the-job. Consequently, it reduces the impact of
working experience on productivity.
Variable θ = 1 θ = 2
n : .012 0 .024 0 .024
r. 065 .0575 (−12) .0717 (+10) .0496 (−24) .0781 (+20)
Rs .063 .056 (−12) .07 (+10) .048 (76 − 24) .076 (+20)
hy 3.18 3.27 (+3) 2.87 (−10) 3.69 (+16) 2.58 (−19)
k 9.12 10.08 (+11) 7.77 (−15) 12.28 (+35) 6.61 (−28)
y 4.51 4.76 (+6) 4 (−11) 5.51 (+22) 3.53 (−22)
S
∗ 12.71 4 .2 (+12) 11.36 (−11) 15.78 (+24) 10.08 (−21)
s∗
i(R) .35 .41 (+17) .31 (−11) .48 (+37) .28 (−20)
H∗
y 2.25 2.26 (0) 2.18 (−3) 2.14 (−5) 2.07 (−8)
ω∗
T 21.75 27.7 (+27) 17.94 (−18) 37.17 (+71) 15.23 (−30)
SD(S∗)2 .84 3.18 (+12) 2.54 (−11) 3.53 (+24) 2.25 (−21)
CV(S∗) .22 .22 (0) .22 (0) .22 (0) .22 (0)
SD(H∗
y) .61 .65 (+7) .54 (−11) .66 (+8) .47 (−23)
CV(H∗
y) .27 .29 (+7) .25 (−7) .31 (+15) .23 (−15)
SD(ω∗
T)1 .96 3.12 (+59) 1.29 (−34) 5.18 (+164) .87 (−56)
CV(ω∗
T) .09 .11 (+22) .07 (−22) .14 (+56) .06 (−33)
SD(hy)1 .05 1.45 (+38) .83 (−21) 1.7 (+62) .68 (−35)
CV(hy) .33 .44 (+33) .29 (−12) .46 (+39) .26 (−21)
Table 5: The impact of population growth on human capital decisions and inequality
The effects of population growth are presented in table 5. For clarity, the second column
reproduces the benchmark values already shown in table 4. The third column considers a zero
population growth scenario, while the fourth column doubles the growth rate of population rela-
tive to the benchmark case. The last two columns repeat these simulations for θ =2 .T h eﬁ r s t
point we make is that the impact of fast population growth is somewhat less severe than the im-
pact of high mortality rates. This reﬂects the fact that population growth has a negative impact
on human capital decisions indirectly only, via the interest rate. Compare for instance the high
m o r t a l i t ys c e n a r i oo ft a b l e4( w h e nm =1 /40) with the high population growth scenario of table
5( n = .024): although r is very similar in the two cases, Rs is almost 1 percentage point higher
29in the ﬁrst scenario. Still, the negative impact of a fast growing population on human capital de-
cisions and inequality is quite large. For example, for the case θ =2 , a doubling of n decreases
average school attainment by 21 percent or 2.6 years in absolute terms; it also reduces earnings
inequality as measured by SD(hy) by 35 percent.
The second point we make is that the impact of lower population growth on human capital
decisions and inequality measures is higher when n starts at a lower value. So, for instance, for
the case θ =2 ,d e c r e a s i n gn from 2.4 percent to 1.2 percent results in an increase in S
∗ of about
2.6 years; b u td e c r e a s i n gi tf r o m1.2 percent to 0 percent results in an increase in S
∗ of about 3.1
years. What is happening here is that the effect of n on r is nonlinear. The same effect is also
responsible for the larger increases in inequality measures that take place when n goes from 1.2
p e r c e n tt o0i nc o m p a r i s o nt ot h o s ea r i s i n gw h e nn goes from 2.4 percent to 1.2 percent.
For clarity, the simulation results reported in tables 4 and 5 only change a demographic vari-
able at a time. It should be obvious that, in terms of human capital accumulations decisions,
the worst possible combination is high mortality and high population growth rates. For instance,
for the case θ =2 ,w h e nm =1 /40 and n =2 .4 percent, average school attainment drops 49
percent, while s∗
i(R) drops 40 percent, in relation to the benchmark economy.36
9C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we constructed an overlapping generations model of a closed economy which as-
sumes, as in Becker (1964)’s pioneering analysis, that economic agents make human capital in-
vestment decisions in the same way that ﬁrms make their investment decisions: agents compare
the monetary cost of an investment today with the discounted value of the future cash-ﬂows that
their decision will produce. Not surprisingly, mortality rates and the economy’s interest rate,
which can both be seen as intertemporal prices, turn out to be crucial factors in their choice. Pop-
ulation growth rates, to the extent that they have an impact on the equilibrium interest rate, also
affect human capital decisions.
Moreover, by positing the existence of a time-invariant distribution of abilities in the popula-
tion and that diminishing returns to schooling years set in faster for low ability people than for
high ability people, we offered a new mechanism by which mortality rates, population growth
rates and interest rates may impact on inequality, both within and across cohorts.
For simplicity, there are no frictions in this model economy. We assume the existence of
perfect credit markets. Agents may differ in their endowment of ability, but they are all born with
zero assets and are all free to incur debt for at least the duration of their studies. This assumption
is certainly not realistic, as most poor families that are credit constrained, because they lack
collateral, can testify. But it helps us to focus on the connection between demographic variables
and human capital only.
The model can easily be adapted or extended to consider many other issues. For example, we
have used an open economy version of it with realistic age-speciﬁc mortality rates to study the
36Space constraints preclude the discussion of the way other exogenous variables may interact in nonlinear ways
with mortality and fertility in the determination of human capital and inequality.
30impact on income and expected lifetime utility of technological shocks and demographic shocks
such as the HIV-AIDS epidemic.
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33A Technical Appendix
A.1 Derivation of eq. (11) and Condition 1
From the ﬁrst order condition with respect to si – eq. (8) – we obtain the optimal quantity of







UsingthesolutionΛa(j,v)=Λa(j,t)e−(r+m)(v−t) wherev ≥ t ≥ j0,a ndw(v)=w(t)eg(v−t)
in the second ﬂow eq. dΛh(j,v)/dv = δΛh(j,v) − w(v)Λa(j,v),w eg e t ,a f t e rd e ﬁ n i n g















































Now, term (I) of eq. (37) is always positive because the integral is a sum of positive terms.
If the integral in (I) converges as v →∞ , this ﬁrst term (in parenthesis) of eq. (37) will





Eq. (38) is eq. (11) given in main text, with t substituted for v; eq. (39) is Condition 1(i).
However, these conditions are not sufﬁcient because it is still possible for the integral of
term (I) of eq. (37) to grow faster than its term (II) converges to 0. In order to deal with
sufﬁciency, we need to compute the integral of term (I). Given condition (38) and eq. (36), we
37When R =0 , this product would not converge either as v →∞ .
ihave Ψ(j,s)=E(j,s)(b/R)b/(1−b). Finally, assuming that E(j,s)=φh(j,j)e−λ(s−j),e q .( 3 7 )









where b R = r + m + λ − g,a n dw ea s s u m eb R 6=0 .N o w ,a sv →∞ , the ﬁrst term of the
previous expression will tend to zero because of condition (39); but the second term will only
converge to zero if b R>0, and this is Condition 1(ii).
A.2 Derivation of K(t)
A prerequisite to aggregation is to have the expressions for individual assets. In footnote (9) we






































Now, y(j,x)=w(x)hy(j,x). Substituting w(x) for w(j0)eg(x−j0) and using eq. (16), with v
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   
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We now proceed to aggregate these individual assets. We have to make a distinction between









Using eqs. (41) and (43), with v substituted for t, j0 for j + s,a n dt e r mw(j0)h(j,j0) substi-

















































Deﬁning R0 = m+ n + g + θ−1(ρ − r) and imposing R0 > 0 to guarantee that K(t) takes a
iiiﬁnite value, the last expression may be integrated to give38
K(t)





































































= w(t)h(t,t)L(t,t)e−(m+n)s+f(s){Ψ1(r)Ψ2(r) − Ψ3(r)},


































A.3 Derivation of Condition 7
In the main text, we have established that those agents alive at t that are yet to join the workforce
will all have negative ﬁnancial wealth. But this means that the agents who work must, in the
aggregate, have positive ﬁnancial assets, otherwise K(t) would necessarily be negative. Let us
then compute the ﬁnancial assets of the working population. In what follows, we will use the ﬁrst





plus eq. (25) to get
Z t−s
−∞



































38We assume that r 6= n + g just to avoid having to deal with two cases.






































We know that the expression in eq. (44) inside the curly brackets must be positive, otherwise
the whole integral will be negative. But because of Condition 5, which reads r+m>θ −1(r−ρ),
the exponential termin the ﬁrst line of the expression inside the curly brackets must necessarily be




























































Now, if z is not positive, K(t) will necessarily be negative. In order to analyse the effects of






b R +( 1− b)(δ − λ)
i
But since b R>0 and δ>λ , it must necessarily be true that b R +( 1− b)(δ − λ) > 0.B u ti n
this case z would be negative. We have therefore shown that r cannot be equal to θ(g − δ)+ρ.
On the other hand, Condition 1 (i) in main text reads r>g− m − δ.I f g − m − δ>
θ(g−δ)+ρ, then the inequality r>θ (g−δ)+ρ is trivially veriﬁed. So consider the case where
g−m−δ<θ (g−δ)+ρ.41 What happens if g−m−δ<r<θ (g−δ)+ρ?T h e nR0 > ∆1 and
term (A) is negative. Moreover, since ∆1 > ∆2,t e r m(B) is also negative. But in this case z
would be negative. Hence so far we have established the following: r>θ (g − δ)+ρ, R0 < ∆1,
and term (A) must be positive.







∆1 > 0,a n d0 ≥ 1
R0 − 1
∆2 > λ−δ












∆1∆2 − si(R) 1
b∆1∆2
39Notice that we could have obtained this number directly from equation (29) by setting s to 0. This would have
amounted to assume that the population consists entirely of workers.
40To get the expression to the right of si(R), we substituted R for b R + δ − λ and (1/∆1 − 1/∆2)f o r−(δ −
λ)/(∆1∆2).




















Now, given Condition 3, which amounts to say that
si(R)
b > δ
R, the l.h.s. of inequality (45)
must be negative. But in this case z would be negative. We can therefore conclude that, when
δ>λ , R0 < ∆2 < ∆1, (A) and (B) will both be positive, and a necessary condition for
equilibrium is that r>θ (g − λ)+ρ.
A.4 Derivation of c(t,t)L(t,t) as a function of C(t) and K(t)
Let ypv(j,t) stand for the present value of labour income at t for a individual born at time j.W e
have ypv(j,t)=
R ∞
t e−(r+m)(x−t)y(j,x)dx,w h e r ey(j,x)=w(x)hy(j,x). We need to make a
distinction between those agents alive at t who already work and those who do not. Regarding














. As for those already in the workforce, t>j 0,















Deﬁning Y pv(t) as aggregate human wealth, Y pv(t)=
R t



















n + g − r
#
(46)
But aggregate wealth W(t) is equal to aggregate human wealth Y pv(t) plus aggregate ﬁnan-




r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
− K(t) (47)
On the other hand, c(t,t)=
£
r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¤
ωT(t,t).U s i n g e q .( 2 3 ) , w e h a v e
42We recall that j
0 = j + s.
viωT(t,t)=w(t)h(t,t)e−Rss+f(s)Ψ1(r), hence
c(t,t)L(t,t)=w(t)h(t,t)L(t,t)e−Rss+f(s) £
r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¤
Ψ1(r)




r + m − θ−1(r − ρ)
¤
K(t)
e(r−n−g)sΨ3(r)Ψ1(r)−1 +( e(r−n−g)s − 1)/(r − n − g)
This is the expression which is then substituted in eq. (31) in order to obtain eq. (32).
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